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Law and Regime Change: The 
Common Law, Knowledge Regimes, 
and Democracy Between the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
Kunal M. Parker∗ 
Abstract 
Using a change in knowledge regime as a paradigm of regime change, this paper explores 
the career of common law thinking in the United States between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. It shows how, under the pressures of anti-foundational thinking, 
knowledge moved from a nineteenth-century regime of “knowledge that,” a regime of 
foundational knowledge, to an early-twentieth-century regime of “knowledge how,” a re-
gime of anti-foundational knowledge concerned with the procedures, processes, and 
protocols of arriving at knowledge. It then shows how common law thinkers adapted to 
this change in knowledge regimes, transforming the common law from a body of sub-
stantive knowledge into one that was principally procedural. The paper also shows, 
however, that the traditional discourses of the common law survived this intellectual 
transformation.  
I. Introduction 
At least in English, the slightly negative contemporary valence of the word “regime”—a 
word typically reserved for non-Western and non-democratic governments—means that 
the term “regime change” carries with it a whiff of unwillingness to surrender wrongly-
held power, de-legitimation of an old order, and use of force. But what if the “regime 
change” in question is instead a change in a knowledge regime that reconfigures the imag-
ined relationship between law and democracy? What if, furthermore, as a result of this 
change in a knowledge regime, an older conception of law, once relatively compatible 
with a certain understanding of democracy, comes to be seen as incompatible with a 
changed conception of democracy? How does law transform itself in such a situation? 
I explore these questions in the context of a change in knowledge regimes that 
took place in the United States—and, indeed, all over the Western world—as the nine-
teenth century gave way to the twentieth. As a result of this change of knowledge regimes, 
I argue, the common law, which had once been seen as more or less compatible with 
American democracy, came to be seen as incompatible with it. How did common lawyers 
respond? What does this tell us in a more general sense about law’s relationship to regime 
change?  
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A few points of qualification are in order. First, some might take issue with this 
paper’s focus on a change in knowledge regimes as the engine that drove changes in con-
ceptions of law and democracy. Why not focus on something more “real”: industrial or-
organization, capital-labor relations, demographic shifts, political mobilization, and the 
like? Briefly put, this is an argument about what counts as the motor of historical change, 
an old theme in the historiography of ideas that I eschew. I make no apologies for focus-
ing on a change in knowledge regimes, but simply note that the changes I care about went 
along with a host of other, allegedly more “real,” changes. Second, it goes without saying 
that the change in knowledge regimes and the altered conceptions of law and democracy 
that are the subject of this paper are abstractions culled from the swirl of American intel-
lectual life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I do not mean for them in 
any way to represent the totality of American thought in this period. As a related matter, I 
also recognize the considerable simplification, conceptual and otherwise, involved in 
speaking of a “knowledge regime” in the first place. What is a knowledge regime? How 
does one discern its outlines? Does not every historical period teem with a plethora of 
knowledge regimes, such that it is extremely difficult to posit the dominance of one and 
hence to talk meaningfully about change and directionality? These are all entirely valid 
questions. Nevertheless, I ask the reader’s indulgence because I seek to illustrate some-
thing specific about the intellectual and legal history of the period as I broach the question 
of how law responds to regime change. Finally, from my perspective, the change in 
knowledge regimes that is the subject of this paper carries with it no particular political va-
lence. I care neither to demonize nor to lionize any particular knowledge regime. I am 
interested simply in highlighting an intellectual shift and exploring how law adjusted to 
this shift. I hope thereby to illuminate a specific corner of American intellectual and legal 
history, one that has received considerable attention from scholars, but perhaps not in 
quite this way. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss dominant 
nineteenth-century knowledge regimes and their relationship to conceptions of democracy 
and the common law. Second, I discuss the change in knowledge regime between the late 
nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century and the resulting “crisis” of the com-
mon law that it produced. In this section, I focus centrally on the question of how the 
common law responded to this change in knowledge regime. Finally, I draw some general 
conclusions from the narrative of law’s response to regime change. 
II. “Knowing That”: The Common Law and the  
Knowledge Regime in Nineteenth-Century America 
Nineteenth-century America was a society that largely believed in the “given” foundations 
of the world. In this regard, it differed little from the societies that preceded it. A sense of 
given foundations allowed nineteenth-century Americans to know the world in a substan-
tive way. Knowledge took the form of “knowing that”: an ability to specify that the world 
was structured a particular way.  
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To begin with, nineteenth-century Americans were overwhelmingly religious. For 
the majority of Americans, God’s laws governed everything. Biblical injunctions were rou-
tinely invoked to explain (or contest) the order of nature, the structure of law, polity, and 
economy, the shape of the family, racial and gender hierarchies, and so on. The country’s 
proliferation of religious denominations and the energy of its religious conflict suggest not 
that God’s laws were deemed unknowable, but that there was no agreement as to what 
their precise meaning and contours were. 
Where nineteenth-century Americans cleaved to more secular kinds of knowledge, 
these secular kinds of knowledge possessed distinctly “God-like” attributes insofar as, in 
the opinion of their adherents, they posited substantive foundations that were alleged to 
govern the world. Thus, as nineteenth-century Americans and Europeans shed static 
eighteenth-century models for understanding man, nature, and society in favor of more 
dynamic “historical” ones, the “history” that they came up with to explain the structure 
and movement of polity and society bore a striking resemblance to the Christian eschatol-
ogy it replaced insofar as it confidently asserted the underlying meaning, foundation, and 
direction of polity and society. This is true of all the major secular historical sensibilities 
that emerged and faded over the course of the nineteenth century: the Scottish feudalism-
to-commerce narratives that were a holdover from the eighteenth century; Marxist, Hege-
lian, and Comtean historical accounts; Herbert Spencer’s theory that society moved from 
a military state to an industrial one; and Henry Maine’s view of societies as moving from 
the rule of “status” to that of “contract.”1 The “God-like” historical faiths of the nine-
teenth century allowed their adherents to make sense of past, present, and future; to 
designate this or that phenomenon as a marker of an outdated society or as the harbinger 
of a future one; and to argue for (or resist) change in terms of where they thought history 
was headed. What I have said of nineteenth-century “history” can, of course, be extended 
to all of the cognate knowledges—anthropology, economics, philology, political science, 
sociology—that emerged over the course of the century. 
To assert that the world was structured a given way—whether by God, history, 
reason, or something else—was also to insist upon limits to self-making, whether at the 
level of the individual or at the level of democratic society. Nineteenth-century 
“knowledge that” implied, in other words, that human intellection and activity came 
bounded, that many things lay beyond the power of human beings to affect. 
It was widely understood, for example, that individual self-making was con-
strained. Although this was true for all, it was particularly so for those subordinated in 
terms of the “natural” hierarchies of gender, race, and class. For example, in Bradwell v. 
Illinois (1873), the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the newly ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment might invalidate an Illinois law that barred women from the 
practice of law. The Court refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment this way. Justice 
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Bradley’s concurring opinion reveals how the “laws” of “nature” and the “Creator” 
served to limit a woman’s demand for self-making: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the re-
spective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s 
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to 
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the 
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the do-
main and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and 
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of 
a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. . . . The 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of 
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. . . . In the nature of things it is not every 
citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position.2 
The Court’s refusal to use the Fourteenth Amendment to dismantle barriers to women’s 
entry into the professions reveals with breathtaking clarity how “natural” laws serving as 
barriers to women’s demands for self-making infused the text of the Constitution. 
What was true for individuals was also true for agglomerations of individuals. 
Thus, even though political democracy was on the march throughout the Euro-American 
world, it was widely believed that there were rigorous limits to what political democracies 
could accomplish. Thomas Carlyle, a mid-nineteenth-century conservative writer im-
mensely popular on both sides of the Atlantic, captured this sense of democracy’s limits 
by comparing political democracy to a ship. Would the establishment of political democ-
racy among the ship’s crew enable the ship to round Cape Horn? Carlyle answered in the 
negative: 
Your ship cannot double Cape Horn by its excellent plans of voting. The ship may vote 
this and that, above decks and below, in the most harmonious exquisitely constitutional 
manner: the ship, to get around Cape Horn, will find a set of conditions already voted 
for, and fixed with adamantine rigour, by the ancient Elemental Powers, who are entirely 
careless how you vote. . . . Ships accordingly do not use the ballot-box at all; . . . one 
wishes much some other Entities,—since all entities lie under the same rigorous set of 
laws,—could be brought to show as much wisdom, and sense at least of self-preservation, 
the first command of Nature. . . . [Democracy] is a very extraordinary method of navi-
gating, whether in the Straits of Magellan or the undiscovered Sea of Time.3 
Just as democracy instituted among a ship’s crew would do little to affect the givenness of 
Cape Horn, Carlyle insisted, democracy instituted in a society would founder upon given 
hierarchies, rationalities, and orders. To take only one example, an entire generation of 
pro-slavery thinkers convinced of the “natural” foundations of slavery insisted that de-
mocracy would never be able to remedy the condition of American blacks. 
Precisely because it acted as a limit on the self-making potential of individuals and 
political democracies, the dominant regime of “knowledge that” accounted for the com-
mon law’s particular relationship to nineteenth-century American democracy. At first 
                                                          
2 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J.). 
3 Thomas Carlyle, The Present Time, in Latter-Day Pamphlets 19-21 (1901) (1850). 
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glance, the prestige and authority of the common law throughout the nineteenth century 
might seem puzzling. Why would nineteenth-century Americans, who celebrated their 
democracy noisily and energetically, who insisted on their ability to give themselves their 
own laws in the here and now, who had broken with many forms of traditionalist authori-
ty as they broke with Great Britain, consent to have their laws laid down by unelected 
judges who built upon a precedent-based, English-derived body of laws that could not 
point to any articulated democratic origin?4  
There are various explanations. For much of the nineteenth century, the American 
state was relatively small and unable to do the job of making laws for the country’s bur-
geoning economy. Unelected common law judges filled the regulatory gap created by the 
absence of the state. Aided by a robust treatise tradition and an energetic bar, they re-
worked substantive doctrines of contract, property and tort to engineer the 
transformation of the United States from an agrarian economy to an industrial one. At the 
same time, they assisted the accumulation of capital by extending doctrines of criminal 
conspiracy to early labor unions.5  
But this is an insufficient explanation, certainly at the level of political and legal 
discourse. A more convincing answer is that, in a world in which various kinds of 
“knowledge that” operated as a constraint on the self-making potential of democratic so-
cieties and individuals, the common law functioned as one constraint among many, and 
an appealing one at that. In order to understand the appeal of the common law as a con-
straint on nineteenth-century American democracy, however, it is important to go back to 
the origins of common law thinking in early modern England. 
Common law thinking emerged in the early seventeenth century to check the law-
giving claims of would-be absolutist Stuart monarchs. Breaking with medieval concep-
tions of law as eternal, James I had argued that “kings were the authors and makers of the 
Lawes and not the Lawes of the kings.”6 The threat posed by such assertions was appar-
ent to many. In response, seventeenth-century English common law thinkers articulated a 
complex of ideas that indelibly associated the common law with freedom and continuity. 
Common law thinkers argued that the common law, as declared by the common 
law judge, consisted of the “immemorial customs” of the English. Precisely because it was 
deemed to emerge spontaneously from the people, the custom-based common law was 
hailed as the freest of all possible laws. Insofar as it was “immemorial,” dating back to a 
                                                          
4 This is not to suggest that there was no opposition to the common law. This opposition took various 
forms, ranging from codification proposals to calls to elect judges. See Charles M. Cook, The American 
Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform (1981); Jed Shugerman, The People’s Courts: 
Pursuing Judicial Independence in America (2012). I discuss discourses opposing the common law in Kunal 
M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790-1900: Legal Thought Before 
Modernism (2011). 
5 There is a vast literature here. Two canonical texts are Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law, 1780-1860 (1977); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American 
Republic (1993). 
6 James I, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, in The Political Works of James I 53, 62 (Charles H. 
McIlwain ed., 1918) (1616). 
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time beyond the “memory of man,” the common law guaranteed stability and continuity. 
Both freedom and continuity went together. This set up the contrast between the com-
mon law, on the one hand, and monarchical law, on the other. When the monarch spoke, 
he represented the pronouncements of a single individual speaking in a single moment of 
time. When the common law judge spoke, his pronouncements stood for the ancient, 
spontaneously arisen, endlessly repeated freedoms of the people.  
In asserting the superiority of the common law over monarchical law, seven-
teenth-century common law thinkers were also claiming a monopoly over their ability to 
declare custom. Monarchs and parliaments could not declare custom, only the common 
law judge could. This was, ultimately, a claim of monopoly over method, but of method 
that was inseparable from substance. The most important common law thinker of the ear-
ly seventeenth century, Lord Coke, put it thus:  
[R]eason is the life of the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason; 
which is to be understood of an artificiall perfection of reason, gotten by long study, ob-
servation, and of experience, and not of every man’s natural reason. . . . This legall reason 
est summa ratio.7  
All men possessed natural reason. But only the common law judge, by dint of long study, 
observation, and experience, and hence by virtue of having mastered the right method, 
possessed the mysterious “artificiall perfection of reason” to declare the “immemorial” 
customs of the community. 
Common lawyers’ arguments served as powerful substantive limits to the self-
making claims of England’s Stuart monarchs. Monarchical power to give law ran up, in 
other words, against the solid constraints of “immemorial custom.” It is not surprising, 
then, that, in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and the triumph of Parliament, the 
common law, and common law judges generally, came to be identified simultaneously 
with the ancient freedoms of the English, vigorous opposition to despotism, and the vir-
tues of continuity and stability over time. Such identifications proved enduring. As 
scholars such as John Philip Reid have argued, at the end of the eighteenth century, 
American revolutionaries couched their grievances against Great Britain precisely as a 
demand for the restoration of their ancient common law rights.8 
In understanding the role of the common law in the nineteenth-century American 
polity, however, it is important to emphasize that the common law’s insistence upon con-
tinuity—continuity as a limit to the law-giving powers of monarchs—was necessarily 
complicated as the seventeenth century gave way to the eighteenth. In this regard, the 
method of the common law, its so-called “artificiall perfection of reason,” proved critical. 
In the early seventeenth century, when Coke wrote, it was still possible for com-
mon law thinkers to assert that the common law of their day had remained unchanged 
                                                          
7 1 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; or a Commentary upon 
Littleton bk. 2, c. 6, sec. 138 (1979) (reprint of 1832 ed.) (1628).  
8 See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, The Ancient Constitution and the Origins of Anglo-American Liberty (2005). 
Reid’s multivolume Constitutional History of the American Revolution is also apposite here. 
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since Anglo-Saxon days. What they were defending, in other words, was an ancient, en-
during, and unchanged law. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, such a 
position had become untenable. The work of antiquarians and the emergence of historical 
thinking had demonstrated that much of what had passed for unchanging common law 
had in fact emerged as a result of the Norman Conquest. As a consequence, common law 
thinkers were compelled to accept the fact that the common law had indeed changed over 
time. However, they regrouped, owing in no small part to the common law method. Ac-
cepting the fact of historical change, common law thinkers asserted that, in their hands, 
the common law changed “insensibly,” so gradually that change was essentially impercep-
tible to those affected and thus disappeared into continuity. Thus, Sir Matthew Hale’s 
History of the Common Law of England insisted: 
From the Nature of the Laws themselves in general, which being to be accommodated to 
the Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniences of the People, for or by whom they are ap-
pointed, as those Exigencies and Conveniences do insensibly grow upon the People, so many 
Times there grows insensibly a Variation of the Laws, especially in a long Tract of Time . . . .  
Indeed, Hale continued in a well-known passage: 
But tho’ those particular Variations and Accessions have happened in the Laws, yet they 
being only partial and successive, we may with just Reason say, They are the same English 
Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the general. As the Argonauts Ship was the 
same when it returned home, as it was when it went out, tho’ in that long Voyage it had 
successive Amendments, and scarce came back with any of its former Materials; and as 
Titius is the same Man he was 40 Years since, tho’ Physicians tell us, That in a Tract of 
seven Years, the Body has scarce any of the same Material Substance it had before.9 
Thus, the gradualist method of the common law permitted a careful calibration of the im-
peratives of identity and difference, continuity and change. The common law would 
vindicate venerable freedoms and be sensitive to current needs. It would change constant-
ly and yet never change.10 
In the eighteenth century, continuity, albeit now recalibrated to encompass 
change, remained a critical limit to law-making power. Now, however, common lawyers 
no longer attempted to limit the law-giving powers of monarchs: that battle had been 
won. Instead, they denigrated—and thus asserted rhetorical limits on—the law-giving 
skills of Parliament. Continuity was better maintained by the gradualist method of com-
mon lawyers, they argued, than by the more abrupt pronouncements of legislatures. Sir 
William Blackstone’s mid-eighteenth-century Commentaries on the Laws of England celebrated 
the figure of common law judges who were “long personally accustomed to the judicial 
decisions of their predecessors.” Even while he recognized Parliament’s supremacy, 
Blackstone urged on parliamentarians a common law sensibility when he exhorted them 
“to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propose, to adopt, and 
                                                          
9 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England 39-40 (Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) (1713). 
10 My discussion in this section draws from Parker, supra note 4, ch. 2. My thinking there, and in this paper, 
relies heavily on J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English 
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (1987) (1957). 
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to cherish any solid and well-weighed improvement; [and to be] bound . . . to transmit 
that constitution and those laws to their posterity, amended if possible, at least without 
any derogation.”11  
In a similar vein, nineteenth-century American common lawyers would assert as a 
limit to democratic self-making not only the substantive truths of common law doctrine 
but also the imperative of continuity. In creating law through case-by-case adjudication, 
they boasted that their method of law-making was superior to that of democratically-
elected legislatures, whose pronouncements they labeled rash and ill-considered, the 
product of a single instant in time, rather than—as the common law claimed to be—born 
out of a profound solicitude for past, present, and future. Furthermore, as I have argued 
elsewhere, nineteenth-century American common lawyers proved extraordinarily skillful 
at fitting the temporalities of the common law within dominant historical models and ar-
guing thereby that the common law, with its step-by-step method of law-making, was 
better able to realize the given logic of history than democratic legislatures were.12 
In an America governed by the regime of “knowledge that,” then, the common 
law acted as a limit on the self-making ability of democratic legislatures both as substance 
and as method. The truths of common law property, contract, and tort were asserted as 
lying beyond the ability of legislatures to touch. Similarly, the gradualist method of the 
common law, one that assured continuity even as it accommodated change, was asserted 
as superior to the legislative method and thus also acted as a kind of limit. If such limits 
were resented occasionally, they nevertheless survived: they were only one among many 
imagined limits to individual and democratic self-making. 
III. “Knowing How”: The Common Law and the  
Knowledge Regime in the Early Twentieth Century 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and extending into the twentieth, a profound 
intellectual revolution that is often labeled “modernism” swept the Euro-American world. 
Modernism was diverse. Its impact was significant in fields ranging from mathematics to 
art, science to philosophy, law to literature. It came in various national and linguistic itera-
tions. Furthermore, as might be expected, it possessed its own complex history. For our 
purposes, however, it might be convenient to adopt the definition advanced by the histo-
rian Peter Gay. While admitting that modernism “is far easier to exemplify than to 
define,” Gay identified as twin attributes of modernism, “the lure of heresy,” on the one 
hand, and “a commitment to a principled self-scrutiny,” on the other.13 Both of these at-
tributes of modernism were realized, I want to suggest, through resort to a new 
conception of history. 
                                                          
11
 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 52, 12-13 (David Lemmings ed., 2016) 
(1765). 
12 I make this argument in Parker, supra note 4. 
13 Peter Gay, Modernism: The Lure of Heresy from Baudelaire to Beckett and Beyond 1, 3-4 (2008). 
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Where history for much of the nineteenth century had been foundational and 
teleological, offering its adherents the certitude of knowing its meaning and direction 
(“knowledge that”), the modernist historical sensibility was different. For thorough-
going modernists, history had neither an intrinsic meaning nor a given direction. In-
stead, it served principally to undermine the pretended supra-historical foundations of 
phenomena—whether God, reason, logic, morality, transcendent aesthetic rules, or his-
torical teleologies—with a view to showing up those phenomena as existing only in 
historical time. In their use of history, in other words, modernists preferred to be 
smashers of idols; this is what Gay refers to as the “lure of heresy.” Modernists’ icono-
clastic use of history led in turn to what Gay refers to as “principled self-scrutiny.” For 
once the foundations of phenomena had been dismantled, and the phenomena them-
selves shown to be “merely” historical, ground was cleared. Modernists would then be 
able to reimagine present and future. 
This idol-smashing, ground-clearing, and scrutiny-inviting function of the mod-
ernist historical sensibility had two critically important (and interrelated) consequences. 
First, as the pretended supra-historical foundations of phenomena dissolved in the name 
of history, what had previously been imagined as constraints upon democratic and indi-
vidual self-making weakened. The result was an expansion of the sphere of what could be 
questioned and discussed as a matter of democratic politics. Benjamin Barber has written: 
“[P]olitics is what men do when metaphysics fails.” Making the same point in a slightly 
different way, the intellectual historian David Roberts writes that democracy “is the form 
of interaction for people who cannot agree on moral absolutes.”14 Second, the dissolving of 
supra-historical foundations bore profound consequences for the ways in which 
knowledge claims would henceforth be made. The modernist historical sensibility under-
mined “knowledge that” by attacking the foundations on which the secure knowledges of 
the past had rested. But the acid bath of history would necessarily also have to be applied 
to the knowledges of the present and future, i.e., those which modernists would them-
selves create. Henceforth, knowledge would be less stable, more tentative and provisional, 
always experimental and revisable. This brought about a heightened concern with the 
means and processes through which knowledge was produced. Whether in the physical sci-
ences or the arts, philosophy or mathematics, modernist thinkers became intensely 
interested in how they arrived at knowledge. The intellectual historian John Patrick Diggins 
captures this modernist focus on means and processes when he writes: “Without access to 
the objectively real, the philosopher settles for the processes of knowing instead of the thing 
known.”15 “Knowledge that” was ceding place, in a sense, to “knowledge how.”16 
                                                          
14 Both references from David Roberts, Nothing But History: Reconstruction and Extremity After 
Metaphysics xvii-xix (2006) (1995). 
15 John Patrick Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and 
Authority 48 (1994) (emphasis added). 
16 I derived the terminology of “knowledge that” versus “knowledge how” from Gilbert Ryle, The Concept 
of Mind (1949). In a register very different from mine, Ryle discusses “knowing that” and “knowing how.” 
Parker — Law & Regime Change 371 
 
What were the implications of this change in knowledge regime—the change from 
“knowledge that” to “knowledge how”—for the common law and its place within Ameri-
can democracy? To begin with, law was an important site for the operation of the 
modernist historical sensibility. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the late nine-
teenth-century writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the foremost American legal 
thinker of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.17 
Holmes’s now-little read masterpiece The Common Law (1881) was an exemplar of 
the modernist historical method. It began with lines that are now a classic statement of 
how law’s claim to embody formal logic was undermined in the name of history: 
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good 
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, 
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics.18 
Holmes followed through on this opening statement by showing that common law doc-
trines purporting to rest on supra-historical foundations such as logic, reason, and 
morality were little more than the piling up of historical errors and inadvertent transposi-
tions from one context to another.19  
Over the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Holmes’s critique of the 
common law deepened. In “The Path of the Law” (1897), he attacked antiquity and con-
tinuity, two revered bases of the common law: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.20 
In true modernist fashion, Holmes’s attack on the common law’s foundations was an invi-
tation to sustained thinking about what law was to be. As he put it in “Privilege, Malice, 
and Intent” (1894), “The time has gone by when law is only an unconscious embodiment 
of the common will [Holmes is no doubt referring here to the common law’s claim to re-
flect the customs of the community]. It has become a conscious reaction upon itself of 
organized society knowingly seeking to determine its own destinies.”21 For Holmes, fur-
                                                          
17 A key text in this regard is David Luban, Legal Modernism (1994). There is much correspondence 
between Luban’s understanding of modernism and mine, but I have not engaged with his work in this paper 
because, at least as I understand it, we are interested in different questions. 
18 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881). 
19 I make this argument in Parker, supra note 4, ch. 6; see also Kunal M. Parker, The History of Experience: 
On the Historical Imagination of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 28 PoLAR 60 (2003). 
20 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in 3 The Collected Works of Justice Holmes: Complete 
Public Writings and Selected Judicial Opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes 399 (Sheldon Novick ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter Collected Works]. 
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, in 3 Collected Works 377. 
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thermore, when society reflected upon what it wanted law to be, it should look away from 
the traditional resources of the common law and towards extra-legal knowledges. As he 
put it: “For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the pre-
sent, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”22 
Holmes’s critiques of the foundations of the common law were leveled at a time 
when the United States was in the throes of a massive socio-economic transformation 
brought about by urbanization, industrialization, and immigration. Increasingly, there 
were calls from diverse groups—farmers, consumer advocates, labor unions, urban re-
formers, and others—for legislative action to manage the ill-effects of these 
transformations. However, the common lawyerly federal courts all too frequently blocked 
legislative attempts to modify laissez-faire. By the late nineteenth century, under the aegis of 
Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in Swift v. Tyson (1842), the federal courts had developed an 
extensive “federal common law” that they applied in their diversity jurisdiction cases, i.e., 
cases in which the parties were citizens of different states.23 Many considered the U.S. 
Constitution, especially as it was wielded to conservative ends, to be informed by the 
common law. When “interpreting the Constitution,” Justice David Brewer observed, “we 
must have recourse to the common law.”24  
For critics of the federal courts, perhaps the most egregious instance of the com-
mon law joined to the Constitution was the doctrine of “substantive due process.” In the 
late nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protected “liberty of con-
tract” and that federal and state legislation therefore could not unduly abridge the 
freedoms of employers and employees to contract.25 This decision effectively constitu-
tionalized common law contract rights and impeded regulatory efforts. In Lochner v. New 
York (1905), a case that came to embody early twentieth-century “substantive due pro-
cess,” the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York law that regulated the length of 
the work day in bakeries on the ground that the law interfered with workers’ and employ-
ers’ “liberty of contract.”26 
Critics of decisions such as Lochner eagerly embraced the Holmesian critique of the 
common law’s foundations. If the common law was not founded in reason, morality, log-
ic, but was instead “merely” historical and thus capable of being remade, why should it be 
made by unelected common law judges rather than by democratically-elected legislatures 
and the administrative agencies they created? It is precisely in this sense that the under-
mining of “knowledge that” by the modernist historical sensibility led to an imagined 
                                                          
22 Id. at 399. 
23 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
24 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905) (Brewer, J.). 
25 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
26 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The discussion in the preceding two paragraphs relies on 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power and the Politics 
of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America (2000). 
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widening of the sphere of democratic self-making (or, in what amounts to much the same 
thing, the collapse of the “law”-“politics” distinction).  
The concern for Progressive-era critics and their successors was how to conceive 
of a role for law in relation to democracy after the erosion of law’s foundations. Political 
democracy, and the administrative agencies it created, seemed set to displace common law 
judges and to assume directive control of society and economy. How should law respond? 
As might be expected, there were multiple, non-mutually-exclusive ways of thinking 
through the problem.  
In the early twentieth century, various schools of legal thought—travelling under 
names like Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Realism—sought to place law in “social” 
context, to examine its social causes and effects. The most thoroughgoing implication of 
placing law in social context entailed, of course, the loss of a sense of what was distinc-
tively legal; law would simply dissolve into a “society” that political democracy could act 
upon. Some early twentieth-century legal scholars subscribed to precisely such a view as 
they turned from law to empirical social science.27 
Another response was to argue for ever more minimalist standards of constitu-
tional review. Law was to shrink, as it were, to allow for more democratic self-making to 
occur. For example, in the much-reviled Lochner case, Holmes, appointed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court in 1900, famously dissented on the ground that constitutional restraints on the 
activities of democratic legislatures should not be confused with any particular substantive 
idea of what was true. He put it thus: 
But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made 
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opin-
ions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment 
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States. 
. . . I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe 
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and 
our law. It does not need research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be 
passed upon the statute before us.28 
Holmes’s Lochner dissent is a beautiful illustration of the modernist rejection of 
“knowledge that.” As he puts it, the Constitution is made for people of “fundamentally 
differing views.” The fact that we might find certain opinions persuasive and others 
shocking does not go to ultimate truth; it is merely an “accident” or, in other words, a 
product of history and individual background. It cannot therefore be coterminous with a 
law’s constitutionality. But if Holmes would have been willing in the Lochner case to allow 
                                                          
27 There is a vast literature on Sociological Jurisprudence and American Legal Realism. A good starting place 
is John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (1995). 
28 198 U.S. at 75-76. 
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New York’s legislature to regulate the length of bakers’ work days, he did not argue that 
the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment stood as no check at all upon what 
democratic legislatures could do. His suggested standard of constitutional review in the 
case—“that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed 
would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of 
our people and our law”—is perhaps more deferential to legislatures, but no clearer or 
less vulnerable to manipulation than the Lochner majority’s expansive reading of the mean-
ing of “liberty” in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Yet another response—the one that I want to focus on here—was to reconceive 
the role of law in relationship to political democracy in a much more thoroughgoing way. 
In areas such as literature and painting, the shift from “knowledge that” to “knowledge 
how” entailed an abandonment of the nineteenth-century realist attempt to represent the 
outside world in its totality and led to a new focus on the processes and means of literary 
and artistic creation. Up to the mid-twentieth century and beyond, modernist writers and 
painters self-consciously drew attention to the writerly and painterly processes through 
which they created, to the quiddity of language and paint and technique, rather than to the 
thing represented. Perhaps the clearest example of this is mid-twentieth-century “process 
art”—of which the drip paintings of Jackson Pollock are a good example—in which the 
primary object of the artwork is the process of creation rather than the end product. 
In an analogous fashion, I want to suggest, early twentieth-century legal thinkers 
insisted that legal knowledge cease to be a “knowledge that” that could throw up substan-
tive law as a check on democratic legislatures and that it increasingly take the form of a 
“knowledge how,” a knowledge that would consist of the specification of methods, 
means, processes, procedures, and protocols as ways of arriving at substantive decisions. 
In their hands, law self-consciously took on a kind of interstitial, procedural, processual 
role, telling legislators not what law they could or could not make, but how and by whom law 
should be made. Insofar as procedure was deemed especially legal, the most lawyerly part 
of law, this transformation was law’s turning inward upon itself. 
This view was articulated in the early twentieth century and grew in influence as 
the decades passed. Towards the end of his career, the archetypical Progressive (and later 
New Dealer) Felix Frankfurter recalled something he had written in the summer of 1913, 
as he contemplated leaving government to take up a teaching position at the Harvard Law 
School. In Frankfurter’s note to himself, we have a breathtakingly clear understanding of 
the emerging interstitial, procedural, processual role of law: 
The problems ahead are economic and sociological, and the added adjustments of a gov-
ernment under a written constitution, steeped in legalistic traditions, to the assumption of 
the right solution of such problems. To an important degree therefore, the problems are 
problems of jurisprudence,—not only the shaping of a jurisprudence to meet the social 
and industrial needs of the time, but the great procedural problems of administration and legislation, 
because of the inevitable link between law and legislation, the lawyers’ natural relation to these issues, the 
close connection between all legislation and constitutional law, and the traditional, easily accountable dom-
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inance of the lawyer in our public affairs. In the synthesis of thinking that must shape the Great State, 
the lawyer is in many ways the coordinator, the mediator, between the various social sciences.29 
As law cedes knowledge to the social sciences, Frankfurter tells us, the lawyer must become 
“the coordinator, the mediator.” This would necessarily involve a focus on procedure.  
In keeping with this view, soon after his elevation to the bench, Frankfurter would 
insist that law give up its claims to govern substance and restrict itself to the specification 
of procedures. Such an insistence was, of course, entirely consistent with his repudiation 
of Lochner and all it stood for. Thus, in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co. (1939), Frank-
furter argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should not interfere in the substantive rate-
setting work of commissions, because commissions were better equipped than courts to 
adjust competing social values. Rate-setting did not involve “questions of an essentially 
legal nature in the sense that legal education and lawyer’s learning afford peculiar compe-
tence for their adjustment.”30 Only when questions “of an essentially legal nature” arose—
and what was more “essentially legal” than procedure?—should courts should intervene. 
In the pre-World War II period, Frankfurter was hardly the only prominent legal 
thinker and jurist to shift his gaze to method, procedure, and process. As Daniel Ernst 
has recently shown, American common lawyers during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury responded to the emergence of government by commission and agency not by 
seeking to control the substantive decisions of these new-fangled bodies, but by insisting 
that they incorporate, to the extent feasible, the procedures long employed in common 
law courts.31 Perhaps the high point of the pre-World War II focus on procedure was the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s announcement of a new, post-Lochner direction for constitutional 
review: intervention in the affairs of democracy upon failure of the democratic process. In 
the celebrated footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products (1938), Justice Stone argued: 
It is unnecessary to consider now [i.e., in the case at hand] whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the gen-
eral prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. 
On restrictions upon the right to vote . . . ; on restraints upon the dissemination of in-
formation; on interferences with political organizations . . . ; as to prohibition of 
peaceable assembly . . . . 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious . . . , or racial minorities . . . : whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry (citations 
omitted).32 
                                                          
29 Felix Frankfurter Reminisces: Recorded in Talks with Dr. Harlan B. Phillips 81 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 
1960) (emphasis added). 
30 Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
31 Daniel Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in America (2014). 
32 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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If Lochner was about reading a socioeconomic philosophy (“knowledge that”) into the 
Constitution to overturn a legislative decision, the Carolene Products footnote speaks of ju-
dicial involvement only when political processes “ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities” failed to function. 
In the pre-World War II turn away from substance and towards procedure, legal 
thinkers were often committed to the Progressive socio-economic agenda. Unlike 
Holmes, whose skepticism was thoroughgoing, most Progressive-era legal thinkers—
Brandeis is a good example—were committed to mitigating the impact of laissez faire. 
Thus, when they turned away from substance towards process, they were fully cognizant 
not only of how substantive law had been used to thwart the will of democratic majorities, 
but also of the mutual imbrication of substance and process. When they focused on the 
intricacies of the procedures and jurisdiction of the federal courts, in other words, they 
wanted to draw attention to how the federal courts had been able to play a major role in 
striking down economically redistributive legislation. Felix Frankfurter’s and James M. 
Landis’s landmark study, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial Sys-
tem (1928), emphasized that “[t]he history of the Supreme Court, as of the Common Law, 
derives meaning to no small degree from the cumulative details which define the scope of 
its business, and the forms and methods of performing it—the Court’s procedure, in the 
comprehensive meaning of the term.”33 The authors were at pains to show that “[t]he sto-
ry of momentous political and economic issues lies concealed beneath the surface 
technicalities governing the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.”34 Studies such as the 
Frankfurter and Landis study paved the way for Justice Brandeis’s landmark opinion in 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938), which overturned the ninety-year-old precedent of 
Swift v. Tyson and stripped the federal courts of their ability to create a “federal common 
law” in diversity jurisdiction cases.35 The decision extinguished an important fount of con-
servative common law jurisprudence. It was widely understood that procedure and 
process were linked to, and were ways of shaping, substance. 
However, the idea of process became increasingly divorced from an explicit sub-
stantive agenda as the 1920s gave way to the mid-century. Confronted by the horrors of 
Nazism and Stalinism, and eager to find a legal limit to the powers of the expanding state, 
American legal thinkers began to think of process and procedure not just as an adjunct to 
substance, but as something important in its own right. Process increasingly became its 
own end.36 
This was true of the judicial oeuvre of Felix Frankfurter, who, within a few years af-
ter his appointment to the Court, came to be seen as “conservative” in no small part 
                                                          
33 Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial 
System xxxvi (2007) (1928). 
34 Id. at xxxvii. 
35 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
36 The classic text on the rejection of Holmesian skepticism in the mid-twentieth century is Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (1973). 
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because of his unshakeable adherence to procedural exactitude. In 1960, Helen Shirley 
Thomas’s admiring study put it thus: “Justice Frankfurter is primarily interested in method, 
secondarily in result, for it is only through the correct methods that the mystical prestige 
of the Supreme Court will be enhanced.”37 Sticking to procedure entailed judicial respect 
for legislative and administrative decision-making, to be sure, but increasingly also pride in 
lawyerly pyrotechnics. In 1949, Louis Jaffe characterized Frankfurter as “forever disposing 
of issues by assigning their disposition to some other sphere of competence. His world is 
the urban world of the division of labor, of the specialist, the expert. He is the craftsman 
conscious and proud of the illusive niceties germane to his own skill and, in consequence, 
scrupulous in his regard for the integrity of impinging spheres of competence.”38  
The triumph of procedure and process reached its crescendo with the post-World 
War II Legal Process School centered around the Harvard Law School. It is not incorrect 
to see this jurisprudential movement as a scholarly effort to endorse and defend the 
Frankfurterian approach. Many of the important exponents of Legal Process—Alexander 
Bickel, Paul Freund, Louis Jaffe, Edward H. Levi, Henry Hart, Albert Sacks, Herbert 
Wechsler, Harry Wellington—were affiliated in one way or another with Frankfurter. Of-
ten, they wrote to justify his positions. In the Harvard Law School of the late 1950s, a 
student recalled, “Felix Frankfurter was God.”39  
The views of Legal Process scholars are exemplified in Henry Hart’s and Albert 
Sacks’s The Legal Process, a set of teaching materials widely used in American law schools in 
the 1950s and for decades thereafter. Hart and Sacks came up with what they called “the 
principle of institutional settlement,” a “principle” that closely tracked Frankfurter’s own 
views. According to the “principle,” the primary function of the law was that of establish-
ing the boundaries between the spheres of authority of various actors and agencies—
legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, individuals—based on their expertise.40 
As Legal Process thinkers articulated this “principle,” however, they revealed how 
older common lawyerly sensibilities fitted with the new knowledge regime of “how to.” If 
the common law in the nineteenth century had claimed to limit the self-making potential 
of democracies as both substance and method, Legal Process thinkers turned increasingly 
to discourses extolling the common law method. 
Common lawyers had long boasted of their ability to maintain continuity over 
time vis-à-vis the more sporadic or episodic activities of legislatures. This was what made 
the common law method superior. Legal Process thinkers struck a similar note. Even as 
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38 Louis L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 359 (1949). 
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40 Hart & Sacks, supra note 39, at 4. 
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law surrendered substance to legislatures and administrative agencies, Felix Frankfurter 
warned: 
[J]udges are under a special duty not to over-emphasize the episodic aspects of life and 
not to undervalue its organic processes—its continuities and relationships. For judges at 
least it is important to remember that continuity with the past is not only a necessity but even a duty.41 
Law’s new “how to” role was deemed especially suited to continuity because procedure 
was deemed knowable, whereas (at least to modernist lawyers) the substance of law was no 
longer deemed to be knowable. In 1953, in an opinion joined by Justice Frankfurter, Jus-
tice Jackson made this clear: “Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible 
than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and 
defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a special-
ized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend 
before political branches of Government, as they should on matters of policy which com-
prise substantive law.”42 A few years later, Hart and Sacks echoed: “Even though the 
substance of a decision cannot be planned in advance in the form of rules and standards, 
the procedure of decision commonly can be.”43 
The knowability, continuity, and stability of procedure invested it with special sig-
nificance in a world turned over to legislatures and administrative agencies. According to 
Hart and Sacks, procedure was a critical defense against “disintegrating resort to vio-
lence.”44 As a result, procedure became more critical than anything else. As Hart and Sacks 
put it: “In the long run, these procedures and their accompanying doctrines and practices 
will come to be seen as the most significant and enduring part of the whole legal system because they 
are the matrix of everything else.”45 
When it came to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e., in contexts deemed 
the proper institutional preserve of courts, Legal Process thinkers were in broad agree-
ment that the Court had to lay down “principles” that, like the procedure generally, would 
prove enduring. Legal decisions thus had to be different from administrative or legislative 
or private decisions. Here, Legal Process thinkers offered a kind of “how to” for judges 
without specifying the content of what they should say. In 1957, Lon Fuller had argued: 
“We demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do not expect of the re-
sults of contract or of voting. This higher responsibility towards rationality is at once the 
strength and the weakness of adjudication as a form of social ordering.”46 Unlike other 
                                                          
41 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1947) 
(emphasis added). 
42 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.; 
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decision-making bodies, Henry Hart maintained, the Court was “predestined . . . by the 
hard facts of its position in the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, 
charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing 
impersonal and durable principles of constitutional law.”47 Herbert Wechsler’s famous 
1959 discussion of “neutral principles” emphasized that “[a] principled decision . . . is one 
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their general-
ity and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”48 Thus, what was 
deemed a requirement of procedure—stability and continuity over time—was deemed a 
requirement for law generally. 
As discussed in the preceding section, in asserting the superiority of their method, 
common lawyers had claimed a monopoly over it. Beginning with Coke’s early seven-
teenth-century insistence that ordinary men lacked the “artificiall perfection of reason” 
necessary to declare common law principles, this common lawyerly claim to monopoly 
and exclusivity had been built up through recourse to a language of mystery, obscurity, 
and indefinability. Very similar languages were employed to characterize lawyerly expertise 
over matters of process and procedure in the mid-twentieth century. 
Thus, according to Felix Frankfurter, the proceduralist and principled judge—like 
centuries of common law judges preceding him—was uniquely privileged to read the 
community. In the mid-1930s, Frankfurter had written that the open-ended language of 
the Constitution left “the individual Justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to 
gather meaning, not from reading the Constitution, but from reading life.”49 As a justice 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, he would assert: “Judges must divine [the] feeling of society 
as best they can from all the relevant evidence and light which they can bring to bear for a 
confident judgment of such an issue, and with every endeavor to detach themselves from 
their merely private views.”50  
These vague invocations were compounded by Frankfurter’s repeated representa-
tion of the act of judging as essentially incapable of being adequately represented. Thus, 
Frankfurter stated: “[J]udgment is not drawn out of the void but is based on the correla-
tion of imponderables all of which need not, because they cannot, be made explicit.”51 
Indeed, the judge was something of an artist: 
The . . . demand upon the judge—to make some forecast of the consequences of his ac-
tion—is perhaps the heaviest. To pierce the curtain of the future, to give shape and 
visage to mysteries still in the womb of time, is the gift of imagination. It requires poetic 
sensibilities with which judges are rarely endowed and which their education does not 
normally develop. These judges, you will infer, must have something of the creative artist 
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in them; they must have antennae registering feeling and judgment beyond logical, let 
alone quantitative, proof.52  
To be sure, Frankfurter seems not to have doubted that he possessed the requisite “poetic 
sensibilities.” 
Because the ontology of law was procedure, the sense that the judge needed a 
sixth sense “beyond logical, let alone quantitative proof” translated into concrete doctrinal 
stances in matters of processes and procedures even as it reinforced lawyers’ monopoly 
over such matters. When it came to deciding what was a “case or controversy”—a crucial 
constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts—Frankfurter insisted 
that only the “expert feel of lawyers” could resolve the issue.53 The same was true of Due 
Process, a concept that Frankfurter insisted—in contradistinction to his antagonist Hugo 
Black—was “neither fixed nor finished.”54 Indeed, Due Process was also a “feeling”: 
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of 
just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitu-
tional history and civilization, “due process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous 
limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and 
man, and more particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is 
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the 
strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical in-
strument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment 
inescapably involving the exercise of judgment of those whom the Constitution entrusted 
with the unfolding of the process.55 
As his repeated invocation of the language of sensibility and feeling and divination 
suggests, Frankfurter had long been suspicious of too much clarity and definition: “In 
administrative law we are dealing pre-eminently with law in the making; with fluid tenden-
cies and tentative traditions. Here we must be especially wary against the danger of 
premature synthesis, of sterile generalization unnourished by the realities of ‘law in ac-
tion.’ ”56 To be sure, Frankfurter’s fear of too much clarity was born out of a Holmesian 
skepticism of “knowledge that”: “Alert search for enduring standards by which the judici-
ary is to exercise its duty in enforcing those provisions of the Constitution that are 
expressed in what Ruskin called ‘chameleon words,’ needs the indispensable counterpoise 
of sturdy doubts that one has found those standards.”57 But it was also about walling off 
his own expertise over procedure from the prying analyses of critics.  
At the same time, Frankfurter’s aversion to clarity was linked to his common law-
yerly assertion about how law should change: slowly and imperceptibly. Insistence upon 
                                                          
52
 Felix Frankfurter, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in Of Law and Men: Papers and Addresses of 
Felix Frankfurter, 1939-1956, at 39 (Philip Elman ed., 1956). 
53 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-51 (1951). 
54 Felix Frankfurter, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, in Of Law and Men, supra note 52, at 35. 
55 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
56 Frankfurter, Task of Administrative Law, in Law and Politics, supra note 49, at 236. 
57 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall, in Government Under Law 21 (1956). 
Parker — Law & Regime Change 381 
 
continuity went along with a recognition of the necessity of change, but change would be 
folded into continuity through common lawyerly skill. In 1939, Frankfurter employed 
breathtakingly traditionalist common lawyerly language when he stated that “the Court’s 
influence has been achieved undramatically and imperceptibly, like the gradual growth of 
a coral reef, as the cumulative product of hundreds of cases, individually unexciting and 
seemingly even unimportant, but in their total effect powerfully telling in the pulls and 
pressures of society.”58 This emphasis on imperceptible change translated into a refusal to 
plunge too quickly into decision. Procedure proved critical here. In 1934, Frankfurter had 
written with approval: “The Court has . . . evolved elaborate and often technical doctrines 
for postponing if not avoiding constitutional adjudication.”59 As his career on the Court 
wore on, he began to urge delay: “The rational process of trial and error implies a wary 
use of novelty and a critical adoption of change. . . . What evil would be encouraged, what 
good retarded by delay?”60  
Frankfurter’s emphasis on procedure—with its common lawyerly extolment of 
continuity, delay, and gradualism, on the one hand, and arrogation of monopoly, on the 
other—found by far its most conservative expression in the writings of his law clerk and 
protégé, Alexander Bickel, who would become perhaps the most celebrated constitutional 
theorist of the post-World War II period. 
Bickel opted for “the exquisite balance” between adhering to a legal “principle” 
and also keeping that “principle” in abeyance through recourse to common lawyerly, pro-
cedural devices.61 Doing so, he maintained, was the “secret of the [Court’s] ability to 
maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency.”62 As he put it: “A sound 
judicial instinct will generally favor deflecting the problem in one or more initial cases, for 
there is much to be gained from letting it simmer, so that a mounting number of incidents 
exemplifying it may have a cumulative effect on the judicial mind as well as on public and 
professional opinion.”63 
From the mid-1960s until his death, Bickel retreated ever further into political 
and legal conservatism. It is this Bickel that Robert Bork, then Solicitor General of the 
United States, would laud for his “reconstitution of a conservative intellectual tradition 
in this country.”64  
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In important part, Bickel’s rage centered on the jurisprudence of the later years of 
the Warren Court. For Bickel, the Warren Court of the mid-1960s and beyond lost the 
imprecise, ambiguous, common lawyerly proceduralism that Bickel felt was essential for 
legal “principles” to take gradual effect. Instead, the path chosen by the Warren Court was 
one of excessive clarity or, put differently, too much “knowledge that.” In the opening 
chapter of The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, entitled “The Heavenly City of the 
Twentieth Century Justices” (a riff on the title of the historian Carl Becker’s influential 
1932 history of the eighteenth-century philosophers, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Cen-
tury Philosophers), Bickel attacks the Court’s historical teleology as follows: 
The Justices of the Warren Court thus ventured to identify a goal. It was necessarily a 
grand one—if we had to give it a single name, that name . . . would be the Egalitarian So-
ciety. And the Justices steered by this goal . . . in the belief that progress, called history, 
would validate their course, and that another generation, remembering its own future, 
would imagine them favorably.65 
In embracing this altogether too clear philosophy, the Warren Court was engaged in a 
“heedless break with the past.”66 At the same time, Bickel fretted about “the rate at which 
the Court has wreaked itself upon . . . society . . . and the rate at which . . . society as a 
whole seems to be hurtling towards its future.”67 From his increasingly Burkean perspec-
tive, the Court seemed, like the French Revolutionaries, perpetually to be engaging in 
“some luxuriant outburst of theory.”68  
In general, what Bickel found lacking in the Warren Court’s application of legal 
“principles” was precisely the common lawyerly quality of imperceptibility. He com-
plained about the Court’s abandonment of “a wise suspense in forming opinions, wise 
reserve in expressing them, and wise tardiness in trying to realize them.”69 The Court’s 
“first obligation” was, he maintained, “to move cautiously, straining for decisions in small 
compass, more hesitant to deny principles held by some segments of the society than 
ready to affirm comprehensive ones for all, mindful of the dominant role the political in-
stitutions are allowed, and always anxious first to invent compromises and 
accommodations before declaring firm and unambiguous principles.”70  
Bickel’s Burkean, common lawyerly impulse to brake the rate of change fused 
perfectly with the Legal Process understanding of the ontology of law as process, pro-
cedure, and method. Nothing provided greater refuge from reckless and rapid change, 
after all, than a commitment to procedure, that most lawyerly part of law. In The Morality 
of Consent, Bickel lauded the “hard-core of procedural provisions, found chiefly in the 
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Bill of Rights” that possessed a “relative definiteness of terms” and “definiteness of his-
tory.”71 The Warren Court had prided itself on “cutting through legal technicalities, in 
piercing through procedure to substance. But legal technicalities are the stuff of law, and pierc-
ing through a particular substance to get to procedures suitable to many substances is in fact what the 
task of law most often is.”72 
IV. Conclusion 
I have attempted a history of the shift from the nineteenth-century regime of 
“knowledge that” to the early twentieth-century regime of “knowledge how.” From the 
perspective of someone writing in the early twenty-first century, this shift seems, at best, 
to have been a rather provisional one. We live today in a world teeming with different 
knowledges, many of which claim to offer definitive explanations of the world and its 
history. “God” and “knowledge that” seem to be back. Perhaps they never went away. 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century attack on foundations, and the modern-
ist sensibility to which it gave rise, seem like the fragile artefacts of another age. But the 
story is more complicated.  
To those caught up in the shift from “knowledge that” to “knowledge how,” it 
was real, exciting and terrifying. For American common lawyers, in particular, the chal-
lenges were acute. Throughout the nineteenth century, the common law had constrained 
the space of American democratic self-making in the name of logic, reason, morality, an-
tiquity, and continuity. It had asserted its superiority over the law-making of legislatures as 
a matter of substance and method. In the early twentieth century, however, the attack on 
the common law’s foundations had eroded its claims to check the space of democratic 
self-making in the name of substance. Accordingly, just like modernist thinkers in the arts 
and sciences, who turned inward on themselves by focusing on method, process, and 
procedure, American common lawyers, faced with the inexorable rise of legislatures and 
administrative agencies, reimagined their role as being about the specification of methods, 
processes, and procedures. In the early twentieth century, many argued, law should serve 
the processual role of specifying the outlines and boundaries of the many components of 
the modern state. 
In the most general sense, this narrative illustrates the protean character of the 
common law—if not of law generally—in the context of regime change. As the 
knowledge regime shifted from “knowledge that” to “knowledge how,” thereby making 
certain kinds of common lawyerly languages untenable, common lawyers refitted the 
common law. Reaching into the arsenal of common lawyerly claims and discourses, they 
transformed the role of the common law from one of substance into one of procedure. 
More perplexing, however, is how common lawyerly languages survived as the 
common law adjusted to the change from “knowledge that” to “knowledge how.” If the 
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attack on foundations that produced that shift from “knowledge that” to “knowledge 
how” was iconoclastic—motivated, in Peter Gay’s terms, by the lure of heresy and a 
commitment to self-scrutiny—what is one to make of the way the common law’s new 
role as procedure came, once again, to be invested with the mystical qualities that the 
common law had traditionally claimed for itself? If common lawyers once claimed to be 
possessed of an “artificiall perfection of reason” inaccessible to the average man, twentieth-
century common lawyers—even as they accepted the Holmesian critique and transformed 
the common law into procedure—would claim to operate on the basis of “expert feel,” 
“imponderables,” divination, and poetic sensibilities inaccessible to non-lawyers. It is in 
the perplexing marriage of skepticism and mystification, as revealed, for instance, in the 
writings of Felix Frankfurter, that the true challenge of thinking the common law’s career 
in a time of regime change inheres. This also suggests—and here I self-consciously un-
dermine the very historical narrative I have advanced—that “knowledge that” continued 
to pervade the world of “knowledge how.” Modernism might have been an attack on 
“God.” But it turned to “God” to realize itself.  
